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Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the differences between accounting for 
fixed assets under IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  Primarily the discussion will be driven by the 
question: which standard should the FASB lobby for in its joint effort with the IASB to 
converge U.S. GAAP with IFRS?  The paper will start by establishing that financial 
reporting, as it has evolved in the United States, was developed primarily to assist in the 
accountability relationships between management and both credit and equity investors.  
From there the paper will look at which standard is better suited to fulfill this goal and 
enhance financial reporting.  It will first discuss the differences of historical cost 
accounting versus market values in the income statement.  Next, the paper will look at the 
differences created in the balance sheet by the two methods.  Finally, the paper will 
consider additional implications of switching to a market value standard.  This paper will 
attempt to prove that historical cost accounting is the more reliable method of the two, 
provides an equally if not more relevant income measure, and that market values do not 
enhance the financial statements in any clear way.  Particularly in any fashion that 
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justifies the additional costs to the firm and to investors in debt and equity that market 
values would create. 
 
 
 
 
IAS 16: A Brief Overview 
 
IAS 16 allows for the revaluation of assets to market value.  Such revaluations are to be 
made on a regular basis so that the carrying value of an asset is not materially different 
from its market value.   
 
If one asset is revalued to market value than the whole class of assets must be revalued.   
 
Once an asset is revalued it is depreciated under the same method as if the historical cost 
method was being used until the next revaluation.   
 
“If a revaluation results in an increase in value, it should be credited to other 
comprehensive income and accumulated in equity under the heading “revaluation 
surplus” unless it represents the reversal of a revaluation decrease of the same asset 
previously recognized as an expense, in which case it should be recognized as income.” 
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“A decrease arising as a result of revaluation should be recognized as an expense to the 
extent that it exceeds any amount previously credited to the revaluation surplus relating 
to the same asset.” (Summary of IAS 16) 
 
 
The Primary Objective of  
Financial Reporting 
 
Determining the purpose of financial reporting is key in deciding whether 
switching to a standard such as IAS 16 enhances the accounting information provided by 
financial statements. The FASB believes that “the objective of general purpose financial 
reporting is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to 
existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions about 
providing resources to the entity.  Those decisions involve buying, selling, or holding 
equity and debt instruments and providing or settling loans and other forms of credit.”  
The FASB goes on to say that “decisions by existing and potential investors about buying 
selling, or holding equity and debt instruments depend on the returns that they expect 
from an investment in those instruments… Similarly, decisions by existing and potential 
lenders and other creditors about providing or settling loans and other forms of credit 
depend on the principal and interest payments or other returns that they expect.  
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Investors’, lenders’, and other creditors’ expectations about returns depend on their 
assessment of the amount, timing, and uncertainty of  (the prospects for) future net cash 
inflows to the entity.  Consequently, existing and potential investors, lenders, and other 
creditors need information to help them assess the prospects for future net cash inflows to 
an entity. (FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 OB2. – OB3.)”  In 
sum, the FASB defines the main objective of financial reporting as providing useful 
information in making decisions, primarily by providing information that will assist the 
user in determining future cash flows to the entity.   
This has not always been the view of what financial accounting’s main purpose is.  
“(Charles E.) Sprague began his exposition (The Philosophy of Accounts) by noting that 
accounting “is a history of values.”… He also noted the importance of uniform value in 
determining net wealth as follows:  
“Annols or chronicles merely relate facts which have occurred; but true history 
groups together facts of the same tendency in order to discover if possible the cause of 
happiness and misery, prosperity and ruin; so true bookkeeping, being a history, should 
group together similar values in its equations to discover the causes and effects of Loss 
and Gain (Previts and Merino 109).” 
Henry Rand Hatfield believed that “performance measurement could be taken as 
one of the discipline’s primary objectives (Bell 6).”  This view describes accounting as a 
tool for measuring and evaluation a firm’s past performance, not the forecasting or 
estimation of future events.   
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The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) reflected this 
notion of accounting as a history in its Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 1 issued in 
1941: 
“Accounting is the art of recording, classifying and summarizing in a significant 
manner and in terms of money, transactions and events which are, in part at least, of a 
financial character, and interpreting the results thereof (Ijiri 29).” 
The AICPA acknowledged accounting as a means of recording historical events 
of the entity and by making this information available, allowed for users to interpret the 
results of a firm’s past.   
In the late 1960’s is when we start to see a shift in what the perceived purpose of 
accounting information is.  “In A statement of Basic Accounting Theory, accounting is 
defined as “the process of identifying, measuring and communicating economic 
information to permit informed judgments and decisions by users of the information (Ijiri 
29).”  This is not quite the same as the current stance of the FASB, but the underlying 
shift towards accounting as a system for providing information for decision usefulness 
can clearly be seen.   
In 1968, William H. Beaver, J.W. Kennelly and W.M. Voss took this changing 
perception of what accounting information’s purpose is a step further, believing  “that 
accounting must concern itself primarily with ex ante information which is useful for 
purposes of prediction (for example future cash flows).  Only then can accounting serve 
decision-making needs, since decisions are inevitably based on estimates about the future 
(Bell 9-10)”  
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This belief is reverberated by the view of The Study Group on the Objectives of 
Financial Statements, which was established by the AICPA, in 1973: 
“Accounting is not an end in itself.  As an information system, the justification of 
accounting can be found only in how well accounting information serves those who use 
it.  Thus, the Study Group agrees with the conclusion drawn by many others that the 
basic objective of financial statements is to provide information useful for making 
decisions (Ijiri 29-30).” 
This statement released by The Study Group on the Objectives of Financial 
Statement foreshadowed the FASB’s view of financial reporting as a system for 
providing useful information for decision making.  The FASB also reflects the views of 
Beaver, Kennelly, and Voss in that useful information for decision-making is information 
that allows users to predict future events, particularly future cash flows to the reporting 
entity.     
The view of what public accounting’s primary objective is has clearly shifted over 
the years, moving towards a more user oriented, forward-looking information system.  
The point to be made here is that simply because views about financial reporting’s 
primary objective have changed does not mean that the foundations on which the 
accounting system was created have changed, and we should not so lightly toss aside the 
views of earlier practitioners and academics.  In Yuji Ijiri’s Theory of Accounting 
Measurement, he states  
“Though the fundamental principles of accounting have not changed we are now 
interpreting the same principles from a more user oriented viewpoint.  Thus, what has 
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changed is our interpretation of accounting methods and not the fundamental substance 
of accounting (31).” 
If this is true than what exactly is the so-called substance of accounting if it is not 
to provide users with useful information for making decisions and predicting future cash 
flows?   Yuji Ijiri described accounting as  
 “… a system designed to facilitate the smooth functioning of accountability 
relationships among interested parties (ix).”   
I am inclined to agree with Mr. Ijiri that, as will be shown, accountability is what 
lies at the core of what the public accounting system is in the United States.  However, I 
must stress, in stating that accountability is the core objective on which financial 
reporting is based, I am in no ways suggesting that decision usefulness should not be a 
consideration when setting accounting standards, or that accountability and usefulness are 
divorced from each other.  On the contrary, I believe that by providing information that is 
designed for upholding corporate accountability, users are supplied with very useful 
information.  However, To suggest that financial reporting can and should provide 
information that will help investors forecast the next period’s earnings, future cash flows, 
or subsequent stock prices ignores the limitations and the foundations of public 
accounting.  It will never be able to provide all the information that users deem to be 
useful (news, intangibles such as self produced goodwill, managerial plans, etc.) and by 
pushing to include less reliable information such as estimated market values, supporters 
of a decision useful approach turn their back on the role public accountings was initially 
called upon to fill as a check against corporate abuses.  When an accounting scandal is 
uncovered investors condemn management for their greed and their neglect of their 
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responsibilities.  And yet, the finger is never pointed in the other direction.  Users of 
financial statements must also accept their duty as owners of a business to know and 
demand to know how their business is performing, and how management is using the 
resources entrusted to them, instead of viewing the stock market as an easy way to make 
some extra cash.  Quite simply put by “centenarian Frederick C. Crawford, chairman 
emeritus of the aerospace-defense contracting giant TRW… ‘Wall Street has become a 
gambling joint (Previts and Merino, A history of Accounting in the United States 370).’”  
It is partly because of this expanding gap between ownership and management, and the 
dwindling concept of the shareholder as an owner that I believe has led to the view that 
accounting should serve the user in whatever financial endeavor he intends to take on.  
Accounting information is not meant to supply speculators with information that will help 
them make money, it is meant to protect small investors from suffering unfairly from 
corporate abuses, and this is where my major qualm with the FASB’s analysis of 
financial reporting’s primary objective lies.  It neglects the foundations of public 
accounting as a system of accountability, and it makes a mediocre attempt to back up its 
claim that financial accounting is a system designed to provide useful information for 
economic decision making, primarily by assisting users in estimating and assessing “the 
amount, timing, and uncertainty of  (the prospects for) future net cash inflows to the 
entity.”   
On the surface, the claim that financial reporting is designed to provide useful 
information, primarily in estimating future net cash flows, appears to be a very 
straightforward goal, and perhaps that is why the FASB provides no further guidance or 
discussion as to how financial information is to achieve this goal, or how users are able to 
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use accounting information to make such future cash flow predictions.  However, if we 
pick apart the stated objective of accounting, it turns out that providing or using the 
information from financial reporting to assess “the amount, timing, and uncertainty of 
(the prospects for) future net cash inflows” is not such a simple task, if even a possible 
one.  Information provided about assets and liabilities provide no information about the 
amount, timing, or uncertainty of future cash benefits to the firm.  It may be assumed that 
assets such as inventories will be converted into cash relatively soon, but what about the 
certainty that they will all be sold, or that prices won’t change, or that a new product 
introduced to the market will lengthen the period of time in which all inventories will be 
sold?  What about provisions for bad debts, pensions, or tax liabilities, surely they reflect 
uncertainty.  And yet they do not provide information about the timing of or the 
probabilities of making those uncertain payments (expenses with regards to bad debts).  
As financial reporting is now, (and perhaps even within the realms of what accounting 
could do), it is impossible to make a sound assessment of all three of the identified 
characteristics of future cash flows (timing, uncertainty, and amount). In order to estimate 
future cash flows to a firm with any kind of accuracy, you would need a wealth of 
additional information not provided by financial statements, such as economic forecasts, 
demand forecasts, future supply estimates, debt maturity schedules, management 
investment and growth strategies, etc. (Leuz, Pfaff, and Hopwood 67-68)   
In addition to the above concerns, Philip Bell presents an additional issue with 
using financial statements to predict future cash flows: 
 “Predictions of future cash flows directly from actual accounting information on 
the present and past have proved woefully weak.  Those of us who think of accounting as 
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lying in the realm of the social rather than the natural sciences tend not toe be surprised 
at that.  It is one thing to fashion a model which will predict consistently events in nature 
(and even here the environment may change).  It is quite another to fashion a model 
which will predict consistently economic or social events where tastes, resources, and 
technology are constantly changing…  The link between accounting information, security 
prices, and future firm cash flows, on which all macro empirical accounting research 
involving capital markets is essentially based, is a tenuous link at best (Bell 19-20).” 
Bell’s observation does not explicitly mean that accounting is not designed to help 
users in determining future cash flows, but it does reinforce the inadequacy of financial 
reporting to meet such a goal, and that future firm cash flows may not even be significant 
indicator of future stock prices.   
But perhaps I am misguided in my assessment that financial reporting’s primary 
goal is not to assist users in determining future cash flows, so for now, let us assume that 
the FASB is correct in its interpretation of the objective of financial reporting.  Assuming 
this is the case, the FASB itself goes on to acknowledge that financial reporting is an 
inadequate system for achieving this goal.  It states: 
 “General purpose financial reports DO NOT and CANNOT provide all of the 
information that existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors need.  
Those users need to consider pertinent information from other sources, for example, 
general economic conditions and expectations, political events and political climate, and 
industry and company outlooks (FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
No. 8 OB6)." 
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Perhaps to say that financial reporting is inadequate is a bit harsh.  May be it is 
simply that perfection, which in most all cases, cannot be reached by any information 
system, and that financial reporting is the best option.  However, the reality that under 
even the most hypothetical of circumstances financial reporting cannot provide all of the 
information that users need is reason to question the validity of it as a system designed 
for providing useful information.  It seems to me that the matter would be greatly 
simplified if the FASB were to say instead:  
“General purpose financial reporting provides users with an account of what 
management has done with the resources entrusted to it, the consequences of its actions 
and uses of those resources, and an account of the firms performance as a result.  This 
information combined with other information such as general economic conditions and 
expectations, political events and political climate, and industry and company outlooks 
can assist users in making resource allocation decisions and in estimating future net cash 
flows to the entity.”   
This seems to be much closer to the reality of what financial reporting actually is, 
and not what users or the FASB hope or wish it to be.   
The adequacy of financial reporting in providing useful information is once again 
brought into question by the FASB’s acknowledgement that: 
 “Individual primary users have different, and possibly conflicting, information 
needs and desires.  The Board, in developing financial reporting standards, will seek to 
provide the information set that will meet the needs of the maximum number of primary 
users (FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 OB8).” 
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Once more it appears to be that the FASB is trying to reconcile the fact that, 
although financial reporting’s main objective is to provide useful information, it is unable 
to and can never provide information that is useful for the needs of all its users.  There 
will even be times where information needs will be conflicting, leaving one group of 
users better off than another depending on the standard chosen to be used.  Again, I must 
assert that the problem could be resolved if the FASB acknowledged accountability as the 
primary purpose of financial reporting.  This would remove the gap between what 
particular users expect from the financial statements and the information that they 
actually can and do provide.  Unfortunately, since the FASB has placed an emphasis on 
decision usefulness, the FASB will now and in the future, have to justify its emphasis on 
the disclosure of different pieces of information and its stance on different standards to 
users that feel alternative methods or information would be more useful for their 
particular needs.  But perhaps I should not be so quick to judge the FASB, for I myself 
have provided no evidence suggesting that the primary objective of accounting is 
otherwise.  In the next chapter I will defend my standpoint that accountability, not 
decision usefulness, is financial reporting’s primary objective.   
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The Development of Public Accounting  
In the United States 
 
Financial reporting is a product of society, and as such was designed to perform a 
particular function.  This being the case, the foundations of public accounting are crucial 
in understanding what financial reporting as a system has been designed to do. We must 
first look at the development of financial reporting within the United States if we are to 
understand what the function of public accounting is.    
We shall start the discussion in the late 1890’s, long before accounting standards, 
accounting theory, and required financial reporting.  Before this time accounting was 
primarily a tool of the sole proprietor.  It helped him to determine his costs, his overall 
wealth, and provide information to the bank so he could obtain loans.  During the late 
1890’s financial capitalism began its rise, and “it became clear that management would 
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become divorced from ownership and that a financier, such as J.P. Morgan, would yield 
enormous power (Previts and Merino, A History of Accounting in America 129).”  The 
rise of financial capitalism led to a period where circumstances “encouraged the attitude 
that finance gimmickry rather than production was the easiest way to make money 
(Previts and Merino, A History of Accounting in America 129).”  The President of the 
New York Stock Exchange at the time stated: 
 “The financiers of course, were still interested in producing goods for sale, but 
they were likely to be equally if not more interested in profits to be made from issuing 
securities and powers to be gained in arranging mergers and acquisitions (Previts and 
Merino, A History of Accounting in America 129).” 
As a result of these pressures to engage in “financial gimmickry” it became 
apparent to many that protection of investors was needed.  Economists “demanded 
publicity to protect investors’ interests…  Demands for corporate accountability to 
stockholders were being echoed in the political sector as progressive reformers advocated 
and sought public oversight of the activities of corporations (Previts and Merino, A 
History of Accounting in America 130).”  Up to this point in American history 
accounting had been largely a tool of management, and it wasn’t yet widely accepted that 
accountants could fill the role of protector that was being asked for, however, this view 
slowly started to shift with the rise of the progressive movement.   
Political progressives demanded, “public officials be held accountable for their 
actions…  New governmental accounting systems became mandatory under state laws 
and resulted in significant improvements in the conduct of public business.  This kind of 
activity, which required and obtained the cooperation and participation of accountants, 
 17
was a major factor in bringing accountancy to public attention (Previts and Merino, A 
History of Accounting in America 132).”  The above is key in understanding the 
financial reporting system as it is today.  Public accounting finds its roots in demands for 
accountability and is brought to the public’s attention because of its effectiveness in 
holding government officials accountable for their actions.   
During the progressive movement, demands for corporate accountability 
continued and it became generally accepted that the best way to reign in corporate abuses 
was to make corporate accounts available to the public (i.e. financial reporting).  In 1898 
the Industrial Commission was created to “investigate and report on questions relating to 
immigration, labor, agriculture, manufacturing, and business…  One of the conclusions 
reached in the commission’s preliminary report, which appeared in 1900, was that an 
independent public accounting profession ought to be established if corporate abuses 
such as stockwatering and overcapitalization were to be curtailed effectively (Previts and 
Merino, A History of Accounting in America 133).” This is one of the first major 
acknowledgments of the use of public accounting as a means of protecting investors from 
corporate abuses and as a way of holding management accountable for its actions.  The 
conclusions of the report highlighted the need for an organized group of public 
accountants to perform audits of public accountants, and after the release of the report, 
businessmen supported independent audits by public accountants out of fear of direct 
government intervention.  During this period the accountant viewed himself as a foe 
pitted against the abuses and deceit of management.  “As one practitioner stated: ‘the 
professional accountant is an investigator, a looker for leaks, a dissector and a detective 
in the highest acceptation of the term…  …He must interpret, rearrange and produce in 
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simple but distinct form self explanatory and free from mysteries of bookkeeping, the 
narrative of facts, the relation to each other in results.  He is the foe of deceit and the 
champion of honesty (Previts and Merino, A History of Accounting in the United 
States 132).”  The view that the accountant was an adversary to management is one that 
is important to understanding financial reporting.  In its infancy, it was viewed as a 
system for curtailing management abuses and not only acknowledged managements’ 
biases and alternative motives, but was the primary weapon used to fight against them.   
Jumping forward to the 1920’s in post World War 1 America, the role and view of 
the accountant and accounting information changed dramatically.  “Government leaders, 
having adopted a paternalistic attitude toward business, suggested that there was no need 
for the accountant to police the business community – the integrity of management was 
not only assumed, it was eulogized…  One of the primary responsibilities of the 
accounting profession was to ensure that business received a ‘fair return’ on its 
investment (Previts and Merino, A History of Accounting in America 218).”  
Additionally, the influence bankers had over corporate business had greatly diminished.  
In the post war era, corporations began to pay out set dividends each year as opposed to 
paying out earnings in their entirety.  This had the effect of making dividends 
conceptually the same as receiving an interest payment and attracted small investors who 
had grown used to investing in Liberty Bonds.  As a result, they flocked to equity 
markets, causing the number of bank loans to dive.  Banks began investing their capital in 
equity markets as well, and “bankers, like all other sectors of the nation, had a vested 
interest in fostering the illusion of prosperity…  Keeping the investor happy was as 
important to bankers as it was to business management, and nothing that would have 
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dampened investor expectations was likely to be countenanced (Previts and Merino, A 
History of Accounting in America 218).”  With the growing presence of the individual 
investor, it seems that demands for corporate accountability would have increased, but 
there is little evidence to support this.  On the contrary, “investors ignored warnings that 
pure speculation was a nonproductive function that was dangerous and potentially 
destructive (Previts and Merino, A History of Accounting in America 219).”  
Following the stock market crash in 1929, many critics of the accounting practices of the 
1920’s blamed the public accounting sector for failing to protect investors.  However, 
public accountants of the period had neither the authority or the support of the 
government to curb management abuses, and with no major outcry for corporate 
accountability, there appeared to be no reason to make an effort to support the profession.   
After the crash, The Securities Act of 1933, and The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 created the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).  Once again, disclosure of 
corporate accountants was viewed as the best way to protect investors and “independent 
public accountants were among the prime beneficiaries of reformers’ demands for greater 
investor protection (Previts and Merino, A History of Accounting in America 244).”  
The SEC left the development of accounting principles in the hands of the private sector, 
and the public accountant and financial reporting continued to be charged with the 
protection of the investor and filled the role of government regulation.   
At this time, financial reporting was designed to be a system that checked 
managements’ greed and abuses, by holding management accountable through public 
disclosure of accounts.  It was in no way intended to be a source of useful information for 
decision making.  In fact, many believed, as is reflected by Roosevelt’s personal belief, 
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that “investors would (not) benefit greatly by financial reports nor did he think that any 
legislation could prevent people from making errors in judgment about a firm’s 
prospects.  But legislation could force corporations to tell investors how their money was 
being used by disclosing managerial “bonuses and commissions” and by preventing 
presentation of “malicious misinformation” to stockholders (Previts and Merino, A 
History of Accountancy in the United States 274-275).”  Once again the public 
accountant and financial reporting was the system that was used to protect investors and 
hold management accountable for their actions, it was no where suggested that the 
primary function of accounting information should be to provide useful information that 
assists the user in estimating future cash flows or even information that is useful for 
decision making.  In Roosevelt’s inaugural address he stated  
 “The rulers of the exchange of mankind’s goods have failed through their own 
stubbornness and their own incompetence… they have resorted to exploitations.. 
[because] they know only the rule of a generation of self-seekers (Previts and Merino, A 
History of Accounting in America 257).” 
This highlights the shift in the public view of American business after the crash, 
and highlights the development of financial reporting as a system to stand as an adversary 
to managements’ abuses.   
 Taking one more leap forward to finish our historical discussion, we end up at the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002 (SOX), which was a reaction to the events of Enron and the fall of Arthur 
Anderson.  Once again, when there appears to be some form of corporate abuse an outcry 
for accountability and investor protection ensues.  SOX called for upper management to 
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be held accountable for the information presented in the financial statements.  In addition 
to holding management accountable, it also tightened regulation over the public 
accountants and imposed a greater amount of liability upon accounting firms.  This is 
important because the belief that financial reporting is designed primarily as a source of 
information that is useful to users in making decisions only emphasizes the relationship 
of the accountant and the user, when in reality there are three parties.  It is not sufficient 
for financial reporting to provide useful information about an entity to users, because 
from this view, the only concern is with the transaction of information from the 
accountant to the user.  As a system, it must acknowledge that it is reporting information 
that is provided by management, checked by auditors, and then passed on to users.  To 
neglect this fact or to neglect the biases or motivations of management compromises the 
integrity of the entire system.  By recognizing that financial reporting is a system 
designed to facilitate the accountability relationship between management and investors 
and creditors, we acknowledge that managements own account of their actions and 
performance must be called into question, checked with a proper level of skepticism as to 
its correctness, and certified as either correct or incorrect.  However, it is not enough to 
rely solely on the auditor to catch management misrepresentations, the underlying system 
itself must be strong enough to withstand management biases, otherwise the role of the 
auditor would be little more than an illusionist providing a false sense of investor and 
creditor protection.     
 After briefly looking at some key points in the development of financial reporting, 
it is clear that it was developed around the primary objective of providing a 
representation of an entity and its transactions, in order to hold management accountable 
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for their uses of investor funds, and protect the investor from corporate abuses.  It was not 
designed to be a source of information tailored to meet the needs of its users or to first 
and foremost provide information that will help in estimating future cash flows.  I feel 
that financial reporting will never be considered sufficient in achieving this goal, because 
management strategy, risk assessment, and unknown future events that effect the firm, its 
industry, and the economy as a whole, are not provided and cannot completely be 
provided by financial reports.    It is scandals such as ZZZZ Best, Lincoln Savings and 
Loan, Enron, and WorldCom that make me believe that an emphasis on corporate 
accountability rather than decision usefulness is necessary, and it should retake its place 
as the objective of financial accounting that it should have never relinquished. 
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Decision Usefulness vs. Accountability 
 
“I have been in business for almost forty years and I cannot recall a period in which 
greed and corruption appeared as prevalent as they are today.  As a result of ongoing 
revelations of scandals, the securities industry will have to accept new legislation and 
regulation to curb speculative abuses of the past several years.  This is long overdue,” 
- Investment banker Felix Rohatyn (Previts and Merino, A History of 
Accounting in the United States 370) 
 
By viewing accountability as the main objective of financial reporting, how does 
this change our interpretation of accounting and how does this view differ from the 
decision usefulness view?  First off, by viewing financial reporting from a decision 
usefulness standpoint, the user is satisfied as long as an auditor assures the reliability of 
the information.  Under the accountability view, we are concerned with the information 
as well as the underlying system that leads to that information.  In particular, if financial 
reporting is viewed as a means for accountability, then financial reporting acknowledges 
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the pressures of managerial bias and management and investors’ conflicting interests, and 
leads to an underlying system that is strong enough to withstand such pressures.  “Not 
just unbiased information, but ‘unbiasable’ information, is what is ultimately aimed for in 
the accountability approach (Ijiri x).” Under the decision usefulness approach, the 
difference between an information set that provides useful information about 
management of a corporation and information about a storm system is not recognized.  
As a result “the decision approach tends to encourage subjective information assuming 
that it will be unbiased (Ijiri 10).” 
The other main difference between the two schools of thought is that under the 
decision usefulness view the accountant is perceived as working on behalf of solely the 
decision user.  “The accountant is expected to accept the decision maker’s goal as his 
own and then to design an information system most useful in achieving the decision 
maker’s goal (Ijiri 10).”  This is a major issue with perceiving the main objective of 
financial reporting to be decision usefulness, because the fact is that financial reporting is 
a system that has developed slowly and over a long period of time, and for almost none of 
it was it developed with decision usefulness in mind.  The system was designed as a 
private alternative for government regulation and control of the business sector, with its 
primary purpose being the protection of investors from corporate misconduct through the 
disclosure of corporate accounts.  Users needs may and mostly likely will change over 
time, often times very rapidly or very dramatically.  Although accounting itself has in a 
sense evolved overtime as well, it would be very hard to make the claim that its evolution 
has happened or will happen in any kind of sweeping or rapid fashion.  As a result, it is 
very difficult to make the claim that financial reporting is able to constantly alter itself to 
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tailor fit the needs of users, or even that it has had enough time to evolve into an efficient 
system of meeting current user needs. 
The accountability approach on the other hand does not make financial reporting a 
servant to the specific wants of its users, but provides information necessary to protect 
users from managerial manipulation.  It also acknowledges that there are three parties 
present in the interaction.  This is important when determining what information should 
and should not be reported with regards to the users need to know and the corporations 
right to privacy.  Simply because information is useful to someone does not mean that a 
corporation should be forced to report it.  The users’ right to have that information needs 
to be investigated, and determining whether or not that information is part of the 
accountability function provides a useful basis for deciding whether that information 
should be disclosed or not (Ijiri 33). 
To sum up the above, the view that accounting information’s main goal is to 
provide users with information useful to their decision-making fails to adequately 
recognize that the managements’ interests are tied to the information that is released, and 
that management of an entity is very keen to do what it can to make sure that information 
portrays it in the best light.  Under the decision usefulness view the need for unbiased 
information is recognized, where the accountability view acknowledges that the 
information is influenced by bias, and attempts to reduce and eliminate that room for 
bias.  Additionally, the accountability view takes into account the fact that useful 
information is not a natural right of the user, and simply because information is useful 
does not entitle the user to it.   
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Accountability, Performance Measurement,  
And The Income Statement 
 
“Now, profit earning is in general a process that is continuous and often drawn 
out, and the attribution of profits to a particular short period of time, though a practical 
business necessity does violence to fact and must therefore be arbitrary…  The 
determination of profits is, then, the result of method and opinion, not of logical 
definition, and the question arises how method and opinion are to be controlled – the 
ultimate purpose being, as already stated, to attribute to a particular day, month or year 
a profit which is the result of inter-related transactions extending over much longer 
periods of time.  The answer is that principles have in fact been evolved which seem in 
general to work satisfactorily, and that such rules have acquired authority and to some 
extent the force of law (Baxter and Davidson 83-84).” 
 
Embedded in accountability are the objectives to be achieved. Therefore, 
accountability requires a means of performance measurement with regards to those 
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objectives.  One may argue that performance measurement is obviously useful 
information for making decisions, and as such fits perfectly well into the decision-making 
framework as well as the accountability one.  This is true up until the point that you must 
acknowledge that implicit in performance measurement is the pressure on the individual 
or group that is being evaluated to manipulate or bias the information in their favor.  As 
discussed earlier, anticipating and trying to combat managerial bias is best addressed 
from an accountability view (Ijiri 33-34). 
  Possibly the most important, or at least most widely used, economic performance 
measure is income measurement.  If accountability is the main objective of financial 
reporting, and a major component of accountability is performance measurement, then it 
follows that depreciation expense is an important issue with regards to the objective of 
accounting.  Even from a decision usefulness view, Philip Bell raises the question:  
“If one thinks of the decision making process, for all those using accounting 
information inside and outside the firm, in terms of making forecasts about a firm’s 
performance and analyzing feedback on those forecasts, is it really cash flows that should 
be the centerpiece of this exercise?  Or is some measure of income still perhaps the most 
crucial element of information entering into the decision making process (20)?” 
Under either view, income measurement is a very important part of financial 
reporting.  Considering that “reported depreciation may comprise… as much as 40 
percent or more of a manufacturing entity’s total expenses.  And [that] this percentage is 
steadily increasing for many entities as the world moves inexorably away from a labor-
intensive economic structure toward a more capital-intensive economic structure (Bell 
104).”  Depreciation expense is a very important part of income measurement, and thus 
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the effects of switching to a standard such as IAS 16 must be considered with great 
scrutiny.   
What exactly is depreciation expense?  Establishing what depreciation expense 
intends to represent is paramount in determining which of the valuation methods is more 
appropriate.  Depreciation expense stems from the introduction of accruals in accounting, 
which left accountants with the choice between whether to capitalize or expense an asset.  
As can be observed in accounting practice today, the former was chosen.  The use of 
depreciation expense, however, was not a concept that was widely used or reported until 
the early 1900s.  During this period practitioners and theorists agreed that there was a 
need for depreciation, but two schools of thought emerged as to why it was needed.  The 
first school of thought consisted of those who held an operating view of depreciation.  
Henry Rand Hatfield stated that: “all machinery was on an ‘irresistible march to the junk 
heap (Previts and Merino, A History of Accountancy in the United States 219).”  
Under this view, depreciation was seen as an allocation of costs, and stems from the idea 
of matching expenses and revenues.  The other school of thought maintained that 
depreciation was “a means of maintaining capital in terms of physical capacity (Previts 
and Merino, A History of Accountancy in the United States 219),” and that it needed to 
be sufficient enough to ensure asset replacement.  This view was met with great 
opposition, the main argument against it being that the idea that a “depreciation reserve” 
somehow supplied the firm with additional capital to ensure the replacement of existing 
assets was misleading and very much a fallacy.  The Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) supported the operating view of depreciation and it prevailed as the view to be held 
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by members of the accounting society in the United States.  The concept of depreciation 
has changed little since that time; one current textbook describes depreciation as: 
 “The process of recognizing, or spreading cost over multiple periods is termed 
cost allocation.  For items of property, plant, and equipment, cost allocation is referred 
to as depreciation.  As the asset is depreciated, the cost is said to expire – that is, it is 
expensed (Schroeder, Clark, and Cathey 297).”  
It is quite clear that what depreciation expense was originally viewed as under the 
operating view and what it is viewed as today has changed very little.   
Now that we have established that depreciation expense has been in is quite 
readily accepted as an allocation of costs, let us turn our attention to the different 
valuation methods.  The historical cost method currently used clearly bases depreciation 
expense off of the original cost to the firm. Of the two valuation methods, historical cost 
exhibits the highest level of faithful representation (reliability), which is outlined by the 
FASB as a fundamental qualitative characteristic of useful financial information.  It 
provides a neutral and fairly complete view of what it claims to report and is free from 
error.1  In other words, depreciation expense reached by the historical cost method 
provides the most reliable information, since market values for fixed assets are not easily 
obtainable, and will involve either management judgment or the judgment of an 
appraiser, who, needless to say, would be employed by management.  These estimates are 
                                                        
1 It must be noted here that historical cost depreciation has its limitations, but these 
limitations are acknowledged.  Depreciation under this method simply shows a 
reasonable allocation of costs spread out over different periods.  Since it is 
impossible to now how much of the cost should be expensed in that period without 
knowing the exact life of the asset the best that can be done is estimate.  Since 
depreciation is calculated via a select number of set approaches, neutrality is 
increased, granted at the expense of theoretical completeness.   
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thus more subjective than objective.  In Philip W. Bell’s discussion on representational 
faithfulness he states: 
“If the notion of representational faithfulness is to be useful in evaluating an 
entity’s performance in a given period in such a way as to compare it effectively with (1) 
projections of performance for that period, (2) actual performance of other, perhaps 
competitive entities in the same period, and (3) actual performance of the entity in 
question in other periods in the past, than the “existing economic reality” being 
portrayed must surely be an objective, not a subjective concept (xix).” 
Bell has highlighted the importance of using an objective representation of 
depreciation, particularly for evaluating and comparing income measurements.  Nobody 
can argue that numbers based on the historical cost method are the most reliable, 
therefore, the only justification for using market values in determining depreciation 
expense has to be that it provides a more relevant figure than historical cost, to the point 
that it outweighs the drawback of being less reliable. But is this really the case?  “A 
number of studies document an association between accounting income numbers and 
stock returns.  This evidence implies that historical cost – based accounting income, 
which employs cost allocation methods, has information content (Schroeder, Clark, and 
Cathey 298).”  Even if historical cost based depreciation is irrelevant, which usually is 
the beginning of any argument against historical cost accounting, why should it be 
assumed that market values are any more relevant.  The main argument to be had against 
historical cost depreciation is that it allocates costs arbitrarily, and yet using market 
values would be just as arbitrary if not more so.  To fully understand why depreciation 
 31
expense seems to be simply an arbitrary allocation of costs, lets take a closer look at what 
a fixed asset and depreciation is.   
An asset can be thought of as a purchased amount of services which are provided 
by the asset.  A firm does not consume all of those services up in one period, so 
management must break up the cost and match the amount of expired services (expense) 
to the revenues earned as a result of the use of those services.  In other words, 
depreciation is the consumption of services reflected by the tangible deterioration of the 
fixed asset.  A change in the market price of a fixed asset is not depreciation as it has 
been defined in accounting.  For a simple example that should highlight the point, let us 
say you enter into the business of land development in the state of Arizona in 2001, and 
you purchase a fleet of cranes, bulldozers, concrete trucks, etc.  You have elected to 
revalue your assets every year on 12/31 so that you will not encounter the arbitrary cost 
allocation issues surrounding conventional depreciation methods, meaning that your 
depreciation expense exactly matches the change in market value of your equipment from 
the beginning of the year to the end of the year.  Furthermore, let us assume that markets 
for these assets are highly active and extremely reliable values can be obtained for all of 
your equipment so there is no management or appraisal judgment required (a very 
generous assumption).  You use your equipment heavily from 2001 to 2006 because there 
is a wealth of development jobs that you are contracted to work on.  However, the market 
value of your equipment does not drop significantly because the demand for such 
construction equipment is high.  As a result, your depreciation expense is much lower 
than it would be under historical cost methods.  During this period things are wonderful, 
you are experiencing a wealthy revenue stream and expenses are low (at least 
 32
depreciation expense is lower than if you had elected historical cost methods) so your net 
income is high and you are able to attract healthy investment and keep current investors 
happy.   
In 2006 the housing bubble bursts and you are unable to find work in 2007.  Your 
equipment remains idle and you are able to obtain minimal work.  To add to your 
problems the market value of your assets has dropped dramatically since other housing 
developers are also out of work and demand for the equipment you hold dives.  In 2007 
you are forced to record a very large depreciation expense and impairment charge 
regardless of the fact that your equipment has not experienced any physical deterioration.  
Work continues to be minimal through 2010, but things start to pick up in 2011 and 2012, 
and in 2013 the housing market picks up significantly. As a result, demand for equipment 
similar to yours increases.  You revalue your assets in 2013 upwards and have no 
depreciation expense; in fact you record a capital gain that partly offsets your 
depreciation expense and impairment charge in 2007, which is recorded as income (and is 
what would occur under IAS 16).  This means that you not only recorded no expense for 
the period, even though you used your equipment heavily, but you also were able to 
recognize additional income for doing nothing more than recognizing an excessive 
previous expense in a period which was already very bad.  From 2013 until the disposal 
of your equipment, market value drops at a reasonably stable rate.  You are pleased with 
this because it has allowed you to recognize a second time, expenses which you have 
already written off in previous years, reducing your tax liability. 
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 The above example highlights the major problems with market valuation as a 
means of depreciation.  Depreciation in an accounting sense is the physical deterioration 
of assets; the using up of previously paid for services.  The FASB states: 
 “Assets of an entity are changed by both its transactions and activities and by 
events that happen to it (FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6 
CON6-13).” 
The use of market values does not acknowledge the relationship of depreciation as 
an operating expense of the business, and makes assumptions about the asset that may or 
may not include “transactions and activities” or “events that happen to it” as well as 
include assumptions about external demand for the asset and economic, governmental, or 
social factors that may not be relevant to the particular asset while employed by an entity.  
Although depreciation under historical cost accounting may be an arbitrary allocation of 
costs, it at least attempts to reflect the expiration of services provided by an asset as they 
are used to help create revenues.  The use of market values on the other hand reflects the 
compounded views and assumptions of the market as a whole, and has no direct 
connection to the actual consumption of the asset.  Furthermore, when managerial 
judgment or the judgment of a professional appraiser is used to estimate market values a 
whole new layer is added.  Now, not only are you assuming that market values of fixed 
assets appropriately reflects asset deterioration, but you are also assuming that the 
estimates of management (or hired appraiser) are correct for a valuation that may or may 
not reflect actual depreciation of individual assets.  This reduces the verifiability of 
depreciation expense, which is considered by the FASB as an enhancing qualitative 
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characteristic of financial reporting information.2  The above points call into question the 
entire argument brought against historical cost accounting, mainly that it does not provide 
relevant information.  The relevance of historical cost depreciation may be determined to 
be low (although I do not believe this to be the case, but I must concede that straight line 
depreciation may at times be a very arbitrary allocation of costs) but it can hardly be said 
that market values provide a more relevant depreciation figure, if even an equally 
relevant one.    
Bringing the use of market values for depreciation purposes further into question 
is the FASB’s discussion of faithful representation and its relationship to relevance, it 
states: 
 “If the level of uncertainty in… …an estimate is sufficiently large, that estimate 
will not be particularly useful.  In other words, the relevance of the asset being faithfully 
represented is questionable (FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 
QC16.” 
In most cases fixed assets are of a very specialized nature, and estimates of 
market value must be brought into question.  If market values are too greatly dominated 
by estimates and opinion rather than fact, their relevance is diminished.  Additionally, 
even if estimates of market values can be reliably estimated, it may not reflect the 
appropriate amount of use of the asset, in some cases completely contradicting the reality 
that an asset was used to generate revenue during a period.   
                                                        
2 Verifiability as defined by the FASB is the ability of different knowledgeable and 
independent observers to reach a consensus that a particular depiction is a faithful 
representation.  See page 20, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 
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 Since we have established that financial reporting should be viewed as a system 
of accountability, and implicit in accountability is performance measurement, income 
determination is of the upmost importance.  Philip Bell stated: 
 “Reliability, along with relevance, turn out… to be the essentials for accounting 
information to be useful in the decision making process in general, and in monitoring and 
assessing performance, which is a vital part of the decision making process, in particular 
(345).” 
 Although he discusses it in terms of decision making, Bell acknowledges and 
emphasis the importance of accountability (monitoring and assessing performance), in 
particular, reliability and relevance.  Since depreciation expense reached via historical 
cost accounting is more reliable and arguably more relevant than depreciation expense 
reached via market values, we should be highly critical of the notion of using market 
values for depreciation determination.  It fails to attempt to match expenses and revenues, 
and if depreciation determined by market values does reflect the expiration of services 
provided by an asset, it does so as a result of correlation to the physical use of the asset 
by the firm, not because it aims to determine actual depreciation expense.  Additionally, 
we must acknowledge the pressure from management to bias the information.  Although 
under the historical cost method management is afforded the option between different 
depreciation methods, the options are few and the choice must be justified.  It is much 
harder for an auditor to challenge the estimates made by management with regards to the 
market values of assets that are not frequently traded, and which the auditor has no 
special qualifications to value himself.  This has the result of reducing verifiability and 
reliability of the depreciation expense figure.   
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To further complicate matters, under IAS 16, management is afforded the option 
of choosing which classes of assets to revalue and which classes of assets to keep at a 
historical cost basis.  This allows managements bias to permeate the financial information 
even further and reduces the comparability of the financial reports issued by the entity.3  
This is the case because it means that one entity may report depreciation that is 
determined solely by historical cost accounting, while another may determine 
depreciation solely on the basis of market values, while a third may use any combination 
of historical cost and market values to determine depreciation.  It is important to note that 
management will most often base their decisions on which assets to value at market and 
which to value at historical cost on the subsequent tax consequences of using one method 
over the other, not on whether or not the information will be more useful for users.   
Even if accountability is not seen as the objective of financial reporting, and 
decision usefulness is the primary goal, it cannot be denied that income is a major part of 
investors’ decision-making.  This is highlighted by the fact that earnings per share is 
required to be reported in the financial statements, or the fact that the FASB has still not 
amended Concept Statement no 6, in which it states: 
“Information about an entity’s performance and status provided by accrual 
accounting is the primary focus of financial reporting (CON6-7).” 
Additionally, the fact that modern accounting scandals have been executed 
through manipulations of the income statement reinforces the notion that users rely 
                                                        
3 Comparability is considered by the FASB to be enhancing qualitative 
characteristics of financial information.  Comparability is defined as the qualitative 
characteristic that allows users to compare similar information about a reporting 
entity with other entities.  See page 19, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
No. 8 
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heavily on representations of income.  For example, WorldCom was forced into 
bankruptcy because they inappropriately capitalized $3.9 billion of leasing costs instead 
of expensing them. “The rationalization for the capitalization of unused capacity cost 
under the leasing contracts was that the unused capacity was incurred in anticipation of 
(unverifiable) increased future business (Watts).” This also raises some serious questions 
about pushing for the inclusion of forward-looking information that may be useful for 
determining future cash flows.   To sum up the point quite gracefully: 
 “The term bottom line is a U.S. idiom, representing our discipline’s signature on 
our culture.  It is in origin an accounting term, not a medical term, not a legal term, not 
an engineering term.  It has become a pervasive expression that compactly identifies our 
way of life, our competitive values and goals.  The “bottom line” is as much a part of 
identifying the U.S. way of life as is baseball or blue jeans.  As its usage becomes adapted 
to a global capital market order, the term will continue to signify that the role of 
accountants is one that is determining and results-oriented (Previts and Merino, A 
History of Accountancy in the United States 425).” 
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The Balance Sheet, Relevance,  
And Economic Wealth 
 
“The wise businessman will not believe his accountant although he takes what his 
accountant tells him as important evidence.  The quality of that evidence, however, 
depends in considerable degree on the simplicity of the procedures and the awareness 
which we have of them.  What the accountant tells us may not be true, but, if we know 
what he has done, we have a fair idea of what it means.  For this reason, I am somewhat 
suspicious of many current efforts to reform accounting in the direction of making it more 
‘accurate’ (Baxter and Davidson 55).” 
 
Double entry bookkeeping in combination with accrual accounting has made the 
question of balance sheet versus income statement a heated debate over the years.  Again, 
the argument levied at historical cost values is that they are irrelevant and users are not 
concerned with what a firm paid for their assets.  Clearly market values are more relevant 
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because…  I have yet to read one argument that convinced me that market values are 
more relevant to users to any kind of level that possibly justifies the additional costs in 
auditing fees, the possibility of managerial bias entering the estimates, or the decrease in 
“correctness” of the income statement.  The cost benefit constraint of including market 
values will be crucial in determining whether or not switching to a standard such as IAS 
16 would be beneficial.  
Looking at the different users outlined by the FASB, let us start with investors.  
Investors are not going to concern themselves with market values of an asset (an 
assumption that will be challenged later).  Investors will be indifferent if the market value 
of an asset is higher than the book value of an asset because that is a wealth increase that 
cannot be distributed to them unless it is sold, effectively replaced, and there is left over 
capital that can be distributed to them.  Even if management intended to sell a piece of 
PPE, it is not fair to assume that the whole class of assets is going to be sold, making 
market values useless for estimating the possible cash distributions from the sale of a 
particular asset.   
It can be argued that investors are concerned with the value of the assets to the 
firm and its operations, which I would agree that they are, but to say that market values 
represent value in use is simply incorrect.  There is a substantial difference between the 
value in use and the value in exchange.  Lawerence R. Dicksee explains the difference 
between the two and why users are not interested in these values: 
“The justification for thus ignoring fluctuations in the value of capital assets is 
that these assets have been acquired, and are being retained, not with a view to their 
eventually being realized at a profit in the ordinary course of business, but with a view to 
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their being used for the purpose of enabling trading profits to be made in other ways.  
For example, there is no fixed connection between the realizable value of a ship and its 
earning capacity; and in the case of factory, its value to the undertaking depends merely 
upon the accommodation that it offers, and is entirely irrespective of any speculative rise 
or fall that may have taken place in the value of land or building materials.  Similarly, 
the value of machinery to a business depends not upon the market price of iron or steel at 
that particular time.  For practical purposes, therefore, these fluctuations may fairly be 
said to be of no account, and in any event it is quite an open question whether, pending a 
realization (which is not contemplated), any more reliable basis of value could be 
adopted than the actual cost in the first instance – subject, of course, to due provision for 
depreciation (Baxter and Davidson 93).” 
If market values cannot provide a proper representation of value in use than 
perhaps they can provide an appropriate representation of opportunity costs of holding 
PPE.  On the surface this seems reasonable enough, however, to understand the 
opportunity costs of holding an asset investors would also need to know the costs of 
selling the asset, the lost production as a result of not having the asset, the cost of 
replacing the asset, the cost of training employees to use the new asset, not to mention the 
amount of time it would take to sell the asset (since if it takes a long time to sell the asset, 
the estimated market values would not reflect the actual selling price of the asset).  
Additionally, “certain assets were purchased with a plan of operations in mind.  That 
plan, those operations, indeed those people who developed that plan, must first be 
evaluated before alternatives about the future can be considered, and it is the accountant’s 
task to provide the data for that evaluation.  Once this is done, then one can compare the 
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cost of continuing to use the assets for the purposes for which they were originally 
acquired (Bell 151).”  Evaluating performance brings us back to the income statement, 
and means that before we can truly determine whether opportunity costs are being 
inappropriately taken, we must first measure the performance of the assets in use.  Since 
it has previously been established that historical cost based depreciation leads to a 
“better” income statement number, and there are many additional inputs other than 
market values in determining opportunity costs, market values of assets presented in the 
balance sheet turn out to be fairly inadequate for the purpose of estimating opportunity 
costs.   
Now let us go back and challenge the assumption that investors are not interested 
in the value of assets in exchange.  Perhaps they wish to know the value of the company 
if it goes bankrupt.  This makes little sense since investors are at the bottom of the barrel 
in bankruptcy, and will almost never be distributed money from the liquidation of the 
firm, not to mention going through bankruptcy and liquidating all a firm’s assets takes so 
long that market values of the entity’s PPE would be irrelevant.  It is highly unlikely that 
investors are interested in the value of a firm if it goes through bankruptcy, not to 
mention it is questionable at best if the firm would be able to receive market value for its 
assets.  
I must concede, however, that investors would probably be interested in market 
values for two reasons.  First, although market values give only the minimum value of an 
asset in use, they are correlated with discounted future cash flows.  If the market value of 
assets increased or remained fairly high this would be an indication that the expected 
future cash flows from those assets were going to remain high, and if the market value of 
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assets decreased it would be an indication that the future cash flows from those assets 
were going to decrease.  Secondly, Investors may wish to know market values of assets 
because it would allow them to better determine a firm’s ability to obtain more debt 
financing.  Although, it seems that as long as creditors are looking at the same aggregate 
value for fixed assets as investors are, using market values instead of historical cost 
values probably wouldn’t change investors ability to determine a firm’s ability to obtain 
additional debt financing by very much. When taking these two points into consideration, 
the important thing that has to be realized is that the balance sheet has been called to fill 
an impossible function.  The number that represents fixed assets on the balance sheet is 
essentially a multi-dimensional figure, which is expected to sufficiently be condensed 
into a single-dimensional representation of fixed assets.  The balance sheet number for 
fixed assets is being asked to represent unexpired costs and at the same time value of an 
asset in terms of discounted future cash flows to be contributed to the firm.  The reality is 
that these are two separate concepts, and you cannot have one without partially 
sacrificing the other.  By using market values, investors would gain a very subtle increase 
in the ability to predict future cash flows, since market values are only correlated with the 
future cash flows to be provided by fixed assets but don’t actually represent the future 
cash flows to be provided (i.e. value in use).  They may also gain a slightly better ability 
to determine an entity’s ability to obtain additional debt financing, although it is unclear 
as to whether or not this is true.  By doing this however, they subject themselves to an 
income measurement that is open to a good deal of management bias, which ignores 
accountings core function of holding an entity and its management accountable for its 
actions and performance.  Also, if market values are actually useful, and investors start to 
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rely on market values as indicators of future cash flows, management will not be blind to 
this.  Subsequently, management will make sure to use estimates for market values that 
result in a favorable outcome for them, not estimates that will provide the most useful 
information for users.  As a result, the costs of switching to market values are too high to 
justify the benefits of a number that, if actually deemed to be useful, invites management 
to manipulate it for their own purposes.   
Turning our attention to creditors, perhaps we can establish a justifiable reason for 
using market values.  Accounting information is used in debt contracts in order to limit 
dividend distributions and insure a sufficient amount of net assets.  These provisions give 
debt holders a certain level of security on bonds or outstanding debt and minimize the 
ability of managers to pay a liquidating dividend at the detriment of debt holders.  
Because debt covenants are contractual, verifiability of asset values is crucial to making 
the contracts enforceable.  Since most fixed assets do not have easily obtainable market 
values, debt holders will be less inclined to rely on asset value estimates since it will be 
much harder to enforce a contract in a court of law if the estimates are not verifiable.  As 
a result, historical cost based asset values are most likely more appealing to creditors.  
Additionally, debt holders have an “asymmetric payoff” with regards to net assets.  If the 
firm’s net assets are greater than the debt, debt holders do not receive any further 
payments.  However, when net asset value is below the face value of debt at maturity, 
then debt holders will suffer the loss.  For this reason debt holders will primarily be 
concerned with a more conservative, lower end view of earnings and net asset value.  
They want to know that the minimum value of net assets will be able to cover the 
outstanding debt, and creditors will be very weary of upwards estimates of net asset 
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value, especially when they are hard to verify.  Consequently, creditors are content with 
historical cost accounting for both earnings and asset valuation, and most likely are not 
concerned with market values of assets unless they are lower than market value (Watts). 
There is one more thing that we must consider and that is that users (primarily 
investors) wish to estimate the value of equity for a firm.  Critics of this view contend 
that estimating the value of a firm is redundant, since the market has already valued the 
worth of the firm.  If the securities market was a perfectly efficient market we might be 
able to assume this, but the reality is that nothing is perfect and this assumption turns a 
blind eye to the fact that M&A sales prices of firms usually are above their market 
capitalization “because there is a control premium or prices are paid for synergies.  Using 
data published in Mergerstat Review 1994 – 2001, [Patrick] Gaughan shows that this 
premium averaged about 40 percent of market capitalization in the United States during 
the years 1982 – 2000… Since there is no good relation between market capitalization 
and transaction price, we cannot use market capitalization as a proxy for market price 
(Leuz, Pfaff, and Hopwood 61).”  As a result, we cannot ignore the fact that users may 
want to determine on their own the value of a firm.  Since there is an obvious gap 
between the book value of equity and the market capitalization of a firm, and an even 
further gap between book value and market price, the question at hand is: does using 
market values for fixed assets assist users in closing the gap between book-value and 
market-value and in estimating on their own the value of a firm?   
Since the “economic approach to valuation is that the market value of the firm on 
a well-organized securities market is assumed to be the present value of expected future 
dividends to a decision horizon or to infinity (Leuz, Pfaff, and Hopwood 35),” (or some 
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form of discounted cash flow analysis) then incorporating market values for fixed assets 
would be useful in valuing a firm’s future cash flows since the market value is supposed 
to be the “the market view of the future cash flows to be generated by assets (Leuz, Pfaff, 
and Hopwood 36).” If this is true then it would seem that market values for fixed assets 
would be very helpful in determining the value of a firm.  However, before we can 
assume that market values would be helpful in this cause we must first look at some 
drawbacks of using market values as well as some issues created by the accounting 
system as a whole.   
 The first issue is that market values compound the views of many participants, 
and thus include assumptions about the future cash flows of an asset that may not be valid 
when the asset is used by a specific entity.  This again brings up the difference between 
value in use versus value in exchange.  Since a firm will only invest in an asset if it has a 
positive net present value, the market value of an asset will represent the minimum value 
(future cash flows it will contribute) to the firm.  If what the user is concerned with is the 
future cash flows provided by an asset, a conservative estimate limits the usefulness of 
the balance sheet for estimating discounted future cash flows (net value of the company).  
Additionally, when you consider that to obtain market values for most fixed assets either 
the judgment of an appraiser (who is being paid by management) or management will be 
needed, the usefulness of market values is eroded even further.  This also raises questions 
about what valuation techniques should be used, and what assumptions are tolerable in 
estimating market values.  Therefore, not only are market values a conservative estimate 
of the future cash flows they are to provide, but they are not even a precise conservative 
estimate.   
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Lastly, assuming that market values can be easily and reliably obtained, simply by 
valuing each asset individually and adding up their values does not leave users with a 
faithful representation of the firms value because it ignores the fact that firms create 
competitive advantages by using all of their assets in combination with each other to 
create a product or provide a service.  Ignoring these synergies further reduces the 
usefulness of market values in the balance sheet.  When you take all of this in to account 
along with the fact that management will consider tax consequences rather than decision 
usefulness for financial statement users when choosing which classes of fixed assets to 
hold at market value, we are left with a fairly poor attempt at providing users with the 
discounted future cash flows produced by fixed assets (Leuz, Pfaff, and Hopwood 65-66). 
 Unfortunately the problems don’t end with the valuation issues of fixed assets.  
The accounting system as it is now does not allow for essential items (for the purpose of 
determining firm value) to be represented by market values or represented at all on the 
balance sheet.  These items include internally generated goodwill, human capital, 
internally created trademarks and patents, supplier synergies, customer loyalty, and other 
intangibles.  Although there has been much discussion about how valuing and 
representing such intangibles in the financial reports (which I will not go in depth about) 
could be accomplished, there are still a great deal of questions and concerns that need to 
be addressed, and until these issues are resolved the use of market values for fixed assets 
(in most cases not even all of fixed assets) will not provide any substantial increases in 
balance sheet usefulness for determining firm value.   
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Additional Considerations 
  
“On April 5, 1934, Senator Hastings of Delaware rose in the United States Senate 
and declared: ‘An audit is not a statement of facts, and an accountant should not be 
required to certify that the statements contained in a balance or profit-and-loss statement 
are true.  Such a certificate is really misleading.’  …The accounting profession is not 
dishonest.  Its individual members probably possess as high a degree of personal 
integrity as the members of any calling in the world today.  Yet upon the passage of a law 
which would make accountants responsible for material untruths, their profession, 
without a single important exception, felt impelled to change its form of certificate from 
one which states that its financial statements fairly present, in accordance with accepted 
principles of accounting, the position of a company.  Apparently accounting principles 
and the truth do not make good bedfellows (Baxter and Davidson 59).” 
 
Before concluding, there are a few additional things we must take into 
consideration, mainly the fact that under current U.S. GAAP market values are allowed, 
but only for downward valuations.  If it is reasonable to allow for the use of market 
values downwards, then why doesn’t the current standard allow for valuations upward as 
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well?  The main factor is that conservatism has been a pervasive concept in financial 
reporting since accounting’s outset.  But it seems now that both the FASB and many 
scholars are moving towards a concept of neutrality, and are condemning conservative 
practices.  They seem to feel that unbiased information is what financial reporting should 
aim for, that the natural truth of things is what accounting should report.  I would agree 
that in a perfect world accounting information should be completely unbiased, 
unfortunately the reality is that accounting information is inherently biased and to ignore 
this fact by abandoning conservative accounting would be a mistake.  In this sense 
conservatism and accountability are very much intertwined with each other and in 
essence have sprouted from the same concern of combating managerial bias and incentive 
misalignment.  The fact is that information is held by management, and is released by 
management through financial reports.  As a result financial reporting in its nature is 
biased because it represents the views of management.  When you take into consideration 
that most often times management and shareholder incentives are poorly aligned, it is 
hard to ignore that management has both the ability and the will to influence and 
manipulate accounting information.  In recognizing this it is also important to understand 
that the consequences of overvaluing assets is much greater than the consequences of 
undervaluing them, and that most often management’s incentives put pressure on them to 
overvalue assets, not undervalue assets.  For example, as was discussed earlier, the costs 
to debt holders if assets are overvalued is much greater than if assets are undervalued.  
With regards to management compensation plans, because management most often has a 
short tenure and limited liability, they are inclined to value assets upwards in order to 
meet earnings benchmarks (by keeping depreciation expense low), and by the time the 
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true deterioration of the firms assets is realized, they will be gone.  Thus, management 
may be able to receive their additional compensation, which is often times very 
substantial; by doing nothing more than shaping market value estimates upwards.  Also, 
recognition of losses (impairment) acts as a signal to shareholders and the board of 
directors that they should look into management’s use of firm assets and that 
management is possibly not performing up to par.  As a result, management will only 
recognize an impairment charge when it is unavoidable.  However, early recognition of 
gains does not convey any further information about management because they have 
incentives to report increases in the value of net assets.  Therefore, it is useful for firm 
governance purposes to allow for downward valuations, but not upward valuations.  To 
reinforce the point that the consequences of overstating earnings and net assets are much 
more extreme than understating them, “in securities litigation, buyers’ lawsuits against 
auditors and firms outnumber sellers’ lawsuits by a ratio of 13 to 1.”4  This shows how 
much more investors are angered by overvaluation of earnings and net assets than by 
undervaluation’s, and perhaps without even realizing it have shown support for 
conservative accounting procedures.  Conservative accounting, which has lead to only the 
recognition of “unrealized” losses on fixed assets but not gains, is a result of the fact that 
there are greater costs and consequences to be suffered when assets are overvalued rather 
than undervalued. As a result, it is not contradictory to allow for market valuations down 
and then turn around and say that market valuations upward are unacceptable.  Requiring 
valuations downward serves the purpose of protecting investors and creditors, while at 
the same time not allowing management to estimate asset values upward also promotes 
                                                        
4 pages 8-13, conservatism in accounting part 1  
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this goal of protecting investors and creditors.  Thus, asymmetric holding loss and gain 
recognition does not make the argument against market values and the decision 
usefulness view irrelevant, but in fact runs perfectly in line with the concept of corporate 
accountability and protection of investors and creditors from corporate misconduct.   
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Conclusion 
 
“There is much to be said for the simple untruth as against a complicated untruth, 
for if the untruth is simple, it seems to me that we have a fair chance of knowing what 
kind of an untruth it is.  A known untruth is much better than a lie, and provided that the 
accounting rituals are well known and understood, accounting may be untrue but it is not 
lies; it does not deceive because we know that it does not tell the truth, and we are able to 
make our own adjustment in each individual case, using the results of the accountant as 
evidence rather than as definitive information (Baxter and Davidson 55).” 
 
In concluding this paper I wish to again emphasis that accountability and decision 
usefulness are not and need not be divorced from each other, and I am in no way saying 
that accounting information should not be thought of as useful.  What I am trying to 
emphasis is that the financial reporting system in the United States has developed 
overtime and to ignore the foundations laid down in the past will hinder progress in the 
future.  Public accounting makes much more sense when viewed as a system to assist 
accountability relationships, and when it is viewed as a system designed primarily for 
providing users with information that is useful for decision-making, contradictions and 
expectation gaps arise.  Financial reporting provides information that enhances the 
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judgment of users, but it is not designed to make decisions for them.  “Our image of the 
future or of the various possible futures is always dependent on some kind of projection 
of our past experiences.  These projections, however, are unreliable and they may be 
based on a very limited perception of the kind of dynamic system in which the enterprise 
operates.  The basic difficulty here is that the future depends not only on the decision of 
one person, but on the decision of all the decision-makers of a society.  A man can 
control his own decisions within limits, but he cannot control the decisions of others even 
though he may attempt to predict them (Baxter and Davidson 51).” In the end, every 
individual will interpret the information differently, and there will be winners and losers, 
the point of financial accounting is not and should not be to help users win, but to protect 
them from cheating and unfair losses that result. 
With this in mind I do not believe that it would be beneficial to switch to a 
standard similar to IAS 16.  Using market values to determine depreciation expense is not 
only less reliable than historical cost, but it does not even attempt to reflect the actual 
deterioration of a fixed asset, instead relying on the correlation between market values 
and the consumption of the asset.  Additionally, the reliance on managements’ opinion of 
the market value of assets allows for managerial biases to permeate the financial 
statements even further.  Even if only one or two scandals arise as a result of market 
valuation misrepresentations, there is hardly much observable upside to justify the risk.  I 
would also like to note that even if an independent appraiser is used to value fixed assets, 
they are still paid by management, and this creates a very similar situation to that of the 
credit rating agencies who were hired to rate the mortgage backed financial instruments. 
With regards to the balance sheet, I do not believe that investors or creditors are 
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particularly worried with market values of fixed assets, and even if they would find them 
useful in determining the intrinsic value of the firm, many more items, mostly 
intangibles, would have to be recorded on the balance sheet at market value for holding 
fixed assets at market values to make sense. As a result, it is very important to take the 
view of accountability, and not allow managerial biases to enter the financial statements 
via managerial estimates of market values, especially if it is in exchange for questionable 
increases in usefulness at best. 
In conclusion, I do not believe that switching to a standard such as IAS 16 would 
be beneficial; in fact I think it would be detrimental to the income statement and it is 
extremely uncertain as to whether or not market values would increase the relevance and 
usefulness of the balance sheet.  Even considering the fact that both historical cost and 
market values would be showed in the balance sheet, when the external factors of 
managerial influence on income measurement, additional appraisal fees, and the auditors 
inability to thoroughly check estimates is brought into the equation I find it 
extraordinarily hard to justify switching to a standard similar to IAS 16 (also, I am greatly 
concerned with the fact that depreciation is based on the market value method, not the 
historical cost method).  Accounting has its limitations which must be recognized, and to 
move away from convention simply to try to more closely adhere to theory, especially 
when you know theory and reality will not and cannot be the same, would be one of the 
biggest mistakes standard setters could make.  After the stock market crash in 1929 there 
were “references to the post-World War 1 period providing the ‘hard historical evidence’ 
that deviations from historical cost-based, conservative accounting led to the crash of 
1929.”  George O. May had this to say: 
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 “In the 1920’s accountants fell from grace and took to adjusting capital values on 
the books… to an extent never before attempted… In extenuation they might plead 
unsound laws, unpractical economics and a widespread if unfounded belief in a new 
order of things combined to recommend such a coarse, but… the wiser course is to admit 
the error and not be misled again (Previts and Merino, A History of Accountancy in the 
United States 227).” 
 It is not that such a catastrophe will be repeated that is the point, but more that 
historical cost accounting has enjoyed a very long standing and successful career as one 
of accounting’s corner stones, where as dealings with market values and revaluation have 
had a short and rocky history.  The former comptroller general of the United States, 
Frank Bowsher said: 
 “The history of accounting gimmickry in the 20th century has one unyielding 
lesson:  It is impossible to repeal the facts of life.  Ultimately illusions give way to reality 
(Bell 79).” 
  There has yet to be a scandal that has uncovered itself in which historical cost 
accounting for fixed assets has been used.  It is, however, very easy to see how a scandal 
could arise from the use or misuse, rather, of market values.  The point being, that I am 
sure that there are many counter arguments to my paper, but the burden of proof is on the 
supporters’ of market values to provide not just theoretical, but concrete and substantial 
evidence supporting a change away from historical cost accounting for fixed assets.  I 
certainly do not envy those who have accepted such a challenge, for the burden is quite 
heavy indeed, and the strength of the historical cost system stems much deeper than the 
stubbornness of a practice to maintain an outdated and seemingly beloved convention.   
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